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Abstract
Ensuring the usefulness of electronic data sources while providing necessary privacy guarantees is an
important unsolved problem. This problem drives the need for an analytical framework that can quantify
the privacy of personally identifiable information while still providing a quantifable benefit (utility) to
multiple legitimate information consumers. This paper presents an information-theoretic framework that
promises an analytical model guaranteeing tight bounds of how much utility is possible for a given level
of privacy and vice-versa. Specific contributions include: i) stochastic data models for both categorical
and numerical data; ii) utility-privacy tradeoff regions and the encoding (sanization) schemes achieving
them for both classes and their practical relevance; and iii) modeling of prior knowledge at the user
and/or data source and optimal encoding schemes for both cases.
Index Terms
utility, privacy, databases, rate-distortion theory, equivocation, side information.
I. INTRODUCTION
Just as information technology and electronic communications have been rapidly applied to almost every
sphere of human activity, including commerce, medicine and social networking, the risk of accidental or
intentional disclosure of sensitive private information has increased. The concomitant creation of large
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2centralized searchable data repositories and deployment of applications that use them has made “leakage”
of private information such as medical data, credit card information, power consumption data, etc. highly
probable and thus an important and urgent societal problem. Unlike the secrecy problem, in the privacy
problem, disclosing data provides informational utility while enabling possible loss of privacy at the
same time. Thus, as shown in Fig. 1, in the course of a legitimate transaction, a user learns some public
information (e.g. gender and weight), which is allowed and needs to be supported for the transaction to
be meaningful, and at the same time he can also learn/infer private information (e.g., cancer and income),
which needs to be prevented (or minimized). Thus, every user is (potentially) also an adversary.
The problem of privacy and information leakage has been studied for several decades by multiple
research communities; information-theoretic approaches to the problem are few and far in between and
have primarily focused on using information-theoretic metrics. However, a rigorous information-theoretic
treatment of the utility-privacy (U-P) tradeoff problem remains open and the following questions are yet
to be addressed: (i) the statistical assumptions on the data that allow information-theoretic analysis, (ii)
the capability of revealing different levels of private information to different users, and (iii) modeling of
and accounting for prior knowledge. In this work, we seek to apply information theoretic tools to address
the open question of an analytical characterization that provides a tight U-P tradeoff. If one views public
and private attributes of data in a repository as random variables with a joint probability distribution, a
private attribute in a database remains private to the extent that revealing public attributes releases no
additional information about it – in other words, minimizing the risk of privacy loss implies that the
conditional entropy of the private attribute should be as high as possible after the disclosure. Thus, in
Fig. 1, keeping the cancer attribute private would mean that, given knowledge of the public attributes of
gender and weight, the predictability of the cancer attribute should remain unchanged. To achieve this,
the gender attribute in Entry 1 has been “sanitized.”
The utility of a data source lies in its ability to disclose data and privacy considerations have the
potential to hurt utility. Indeed, utility and privacy are competing goals in this context. For example, in
Fig. 1 one could sanitize all or most of the entries in the gender attribute to ‘M’ to obtain more privacy
but that could reduce the usefulness of the published data significantly. Any approach that considers only
the privacy aspect of information disclosure while ignoring the resultant reduction in utility is not likely to
be practically viable. To make a reasoned tradeoff, we need to know the maximum utility achievable for
a given level of privacy and vice versa, i.e. an analytical characterization of the set of all achievable U-P
tradeoff points. We show that this can be done using an elegant tool from information theory called rate
distortion theory: utility can be quantified via fidelity which, in turn, is related (inversely) to distortion.
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Fig. 1. An example database with public and private attributes and its sanitized version.
Rate distortion has to be augmented with privacy constraints quantified via equivocation, which is related
to entropy.
Our Contributions: The central contribution of this work is a precise quantification of the tradeoff
between the privacy needs of the individuals represented by the data and the utility of the sanitized
(published) data for any data source using the theory of rate distortion with additional privacy constraints.
Utility is quantified (inversely) via distortion (accuracy), and privacy via equivocation (entropy).
We expose for the first time an essential dimension of information disclosure via an additional constraint
on the disclosure rate, a measure of the precision of the sanitized data. Any controlled disclosure of public
data needs to specify the accuracy and precision of the disclosure; while the two can be conflated using
additive noise for numerical data, additive noise is not an option for categorical data (social security
numbers, postal codes, disease status, etc.) and thus output precision becomes important to specify. For
example, in Fig. 1, the weight attribute is a numeric field that could either be distorted with random
additive noise or truncated (or quantized) into ranges such as 90-100, 100-110, etc. The use of the digits
of the social security number to identify and protect the privacy of students in grade sheets is a familiar
non-numeric example. Sanitization (of the full SSN) is achieved by heuristically reducing precision to
typically the last four digits. A theoretical framework that formally specifies the output precision necessary
and sufficient to achieve the optimal U-P tradeoff would be desirable.
In [1] the rate-distortion-equivocation (RDE) tradeoff for a simple source model was presented. We
translate this formalism to the U-P problem and develop a framework that allows us to model generic data
sources, including multi-dimensional databases and data streams [2], develop abstract utility and privacy
metrics, and quantify the fundamental U-P tradeoff bounds. We then present a sanitization scheme that
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4achieves the U-P tradeoff region and demonstrate the application of this scheme for both numerical and
categorical examples. Noting that correlation available to the user/adversary can be internal (i.e. between
variables within a database) or external (with variables that are outside the database but accessible to the
user/adversary), [3]–[5] have shown that external knowledge can be very powerful in the privacy context.
We address this challenge in our framework via a model for side information. Our theorem in this context
reported previously in [6] is presented with the full proof here.
Finally, we demonstrate our framework with two crucial and practically relevant examples: categorical
and numerical databases. Our examples demonstrate two fundamental aspects of our framework: (i) how
statistical models for the data and U-P metrics reveals the appropriate distortion and suppression of
data to achieve both privacy and utility guarantees; and (ii) how knowledge of source statistics enables
determining the U-P optimal sanitization mechanism, and therefore, the largest U-P tradeoff region.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we briefly summarize the state of the art in database
privacy research. In Section III, we motivate the need for an information-theoretic analysis and present
the intuition behind our analytical framework. In Section IV, we present an abstract model and metrics
for structured data sources such as databases. We develop our primary analytical framework in Section
V and illustrate our results in Section VI. We close with concluding remarks in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
The problem of privacy in databases has a long and rich history dating back at least to the 1970s,
and space restrictions preclude any attempt to do full justice to the different approaches that have been
considered along the way. We divide the existing work into two categories, heuristic and theoretical
techniques, and outline the major milestones from these categories for comparison.
The earliest attempts at systematic privacy were in the area of census data publication where data was
required to be made public but without leaking individuals’ information. A number of ad hoc techniques
such as sub-sampling, aggregation, and suppression were explored (e.g., [7], [8] and the references
therein). The first formal definition of privacy was k-anonymity by Sweeney [3]. However k-anonymity
was found to be inadequate as it only protects from identity disclosure but not attribute-based disclosure
and was extended with t-closeness [9] and l-diversity [10]. All these techniques have proved to be non-
universal as they were only robust against limited adversaries. Heuristic techniques for privacy in data
mining have focused on using a mutual information-based privacy metrics [11].
The first universal formalism was proposed in differential privacy (DP) [4] (see the survey in [12] for
a detailed history of the field). In this model, the privacy of an individual in a database is defined as
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5a bound on the ability of any adversary to accurately detect whether that individual’s data belongs to
the database or not. They also show that Laplacian distributed additive noise with appropriately chosen
parameters suffices to sanitize numerical data to achieve differential privacy. The concept of DP is strictly
stronger than our definition of privacy, which is based on Shannon entropy. However, our model seems
more intuitively accessible and suited to many application domains where strict anonymity is not the
requirement. For example, in many wellness databases the presence of the record of an individual is not
a secret but that individual’s disease status is. Our sanitization approach applies to both numerical and
categorical data whereas DP, while being a very popular model for privacy, appears limited to numerical
data. Furthermore, the loss of utility from DP-based sanitization can be significant [13]. There has been
some work pointing out the loss of utility due to privacy mechanisms for specific applications [14].
More generally, a rigorous model for privacy-utility tradeoffs with a method to achieve all the optimal
points has remained open and is the subject of this paper. The use of information theoretic tools for
privacy and related problems is relatively sparse. [1] analyzed a simple two variable model using rate
distortion theory with equivocation constraints, which is the prime motivation for this work. In addition,
there has been recent work comparing differential privacy guarantee with Renyi entropy [15] and Shannon
entropy [16].
III. MOTIVATION AND BACKGROUND
The information-theoretic approach to database privacy involves two steps: the first is the data mod-
eling step and the second is deriving the mathematical formalism for sanitization. Before we introduce
our formal model and abstractions, we first present an intuitive understanding and motivation for our
approaches below.
A. Motivation: Statistical Model
Our work is based on the observation that large datasets (including databases) have a distributional
basis; i.e., there exists an underlying (sometimes implicit) statistical model for the data. Even in the case
of data mining where only one or a few instances of the dataset are ever available, the use of correlations
between attributes used an implicit distributional assumption about the dataset. We explicitly model the
data as being generated by a source with a finite or infinite alphabet and a known distribution. Each row
of the database is a collection of correlated attributes (of an individual) that belongs to the alphabet of
the source and is generated according to the probability of occurrence of that letter (of the alphabet).
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6Our statistical model for databases is also motivated by the fact that while the attributes of an individual
may be correlated (e.g. between the weight and cancer attributes in Fig. 1), the records of a large number
of individuals are generally independent or weakly correlated with each other. We thus model the database
as a collection of n observations generated by a memoryless source whose outputs are independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.).
Statistically, with a large number n of i.i.d. samples collected from a source, the data collected can
be viewed as typical, i.e., it follows the strong law of large numbers (SLLN) [17, Ch. 11]. The SLLN
implies that the absolute difference between the empirical distribution (obtained from the observations)
and the actual distribution of each letter of the source alphabet decreases with n, i.e., the samples (letters
from the source alphabet) in the database will be represented proportional to their actual probabilities.
This implies that for all practical purposes the empirical distribution obtained from a large dataset can
be assumed to be the statistical distribution of the idealized source for our model and the approximation
gets better as n grows.
Our measures for utility and privacy capture this statistical model. In particular, we quantify privacy
using conditional entropy where the conditioning on the published (revealed) data captures the average
uncertainty about the source (specifically, the private attributes of the source) post-sanitization. Our utility
measure similarly is averaged over the source distribution.
Intuitively, privacy is about maintaining uncertainty about information that is not explicitly disclosed.
The common notion of a person being undetectable in a group as in [3] or an individual record remaining
undetectable in a dataset [4] captures one flavor of such uncertainty. More generally, the uncertainty about
a piece of undisclosed information is related to its information content. Our approach focuses on the
information content of every sample of the source and sanitizes it in proportion to its likelihood in the
database. This, in turn, ensures that low probability/high information samples (outliers) are suppressed
or heavily distorted whereas the high probability (frequent flier) samples are distorted only slightly.
Outlier data, if released without sanitization, can leak a lot of information to the adversary about those
individuals (e.g. individuals older than a hundred years); on the other hand, for individuals represented
by high probability samples either the adversary already has a lot of information about them or they are
sufficiently indistinct due to their high occurrence in the data, thereby allowing smaller distortion.
As we show formally in the sequel, our approach and solution for categorical databases captures a
critical aspect of the privacy challenge, namely, in suppressing the high information (low probability
outlier samples) and distorting all others (up to the desired utility/distortion level), the database provides
uncertainty (for that distortion level) for all samples of the data. Thus, our statistical privacy measure
January 22, 2013 DRAFT
7captures the characteristics of the underlying data model.
It is crucial to note that distortion does not only imply distance-based measures. The distortion measure
can be chosen to preserve any desired function, deterministic or probabilistic, of the attributes (e.g.,
aggregate statistics). Our aim is to ensure that sensitive data is protected by randomizing the public
(non-sensitive) data in a rigorous and well-defined manner such that: (a) it still preserves some measure
of the original public data (e.g., K-L divergence, Euclidean distance, Hamming distortion, etc.); and (b)
provides some measure of privacy for the sensitive data that can be inferred from the revealed data. In this
context, distortion is a term that makes precise a measure of change between the original non-sensitive
data and its revealed version; appropriate measures depend on the data type, statistics, and the application
as illustrated in the sequel.
At its crux, our proposed sanitization process is about determining the statistics of the output (database)
that achieve a desired level of utility and privacy and about deciding which input values to perturb and
how to probabilistically perturb them. Since the output statistics depends on the sanitization process, for
the i.i.d. source model considered here, mathematically the problem reduces to finding the input to output
symbol-wise transition probability.
B. Background: Rate-distortion Theory
In addition to a statistical model for large data sets, we also introduce an abstract formulation for the
sanitization process, which is based on the theory of rate-distortion. We provide some intuition for the
two steps involved in information-theoretic sanitization, namely encoding at the database and decoding
at the data user.
For the purposes of privacy modeling the attributes about any individual in a database fall in two
categories: public attributes that can be revealed and private attributes that need to be kept hidden,
respectively. An attribute can be both public and private at the same time. The attributes of any individual
are correlated; this implies that if the public attributes are revealed as is, information about the private
attributes can be inferred by the user using a correlation model. Thus, ensuring privacy of the private
attributes (also referred to as hidden attributes in the sequel) requires modifying/sanitizing/distorting the
public attributes. However, the public attributes have a utility constraint that limits the distortion, and
therefore, the privacy that can be guaranteed to the private attributes.
Our approach is to determine the optimal sanitization, i.e., a mapping which guarantees the maximal
privacy for the private attributes for the desired level of utility for the public attributes, among the set
of all possible mappings that transform the public attributes of a database. We use the terms encoding
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8and decoding to denote this mapping at the data publisher end and the user end respectively. A database
instance is an n-realization of a random source (the source is a vector when the number of attributes K >
1) and can be viewed as a point in an n-dimensional space (see Fig. 2). The set of all possible databases
(n-length source sequences) that can be generated using the source statistics (probability distribution) lie
in this space.
Our choice of utility metric is a measure of average ‘closeness’ between the original and revealed
database public attributes via a distortion requirement D. Thus the output of sanitization will be another
database (another point in the same n-dimensional space) within a ball of ‘distance’ nD. We seek to
determine a set of some M = 2nR output databases that ‘cover’ the space, i.e., given any input database
instance there exists at least one sanitized database within bounded ‘distance’ nD as shown in Fig. 2.
Note that the sanitized database may be in a subspace of the entire space because only the public attributes
are sanitized and the utility requirement is only in this subspace.
In information theory such a distortion-constrained encoding is referred to as quantization or com-
pression. Furthermore, the mapping is referred to as vector quantization because the compression is
of an n-dimensional space and can be achieved in practice using clustering algorithms. In addition to
a distortion (utility) constraint, our privacy constraint also requires that the “leakage” (i.e. the loss of
uncertainty) about the private attributes via correlation from the sanitized database is bounded. The set
of M source-sanitized database pairs is chosen to satisfy both distortion and leakage constraints. The
database user that receives the sanitized database may have other side-information (s.i.) about which the
encoder is either statistically informed (i.e., only the statistics of s.i. known) or informed (knows s.i. a
priori). The decoder can combine the sanitized database published by the encoder and the s.i. to recreate
the final reconstructed database.
Obtaining the U-P tradeoff region involves two parts: the first is a proof of existence of a mapping,
called a converse or outer bounds in information theory, and the second is an achievable scheme (inner
bounds) that involves constructing a mapping (called a code). Mathematically, the converse bounds the
maximal privacy that can be achieved for a desired utility over the space of all feasible mappings, and the
achievable scheme determines the input to output probabilistic mapping and reveals the minimal privacy
achievable for a desired distortion. When the inner and outer bounds meet, the constructive scheme is
tight and achieves the entire U-P tradeoff, often the case for tractable distributions such as Gaussian,
Laplacian, and arbitrary discrete sources.
It is important to note that our assumption of knowledge of the source statistics at all involved
parties does not limit the applicability of the framework for the following reasons: (a) the statistics
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Fig. 2. Space of all database realizations and the quantized databases.
for large data can often be sampled reliably from the data collected; (ii) knowledge of statistics alone is
insufficient to generate the actual database at the user; and (iii) most importantly, the statistical knowledge
enables us to find the optimal input to output probabilistic mapping (i.e., a perturbation matched to the
source statistics) that satisfy specific utility and privacy measures. The power of our approach is that
it completely eliminates signal-perturbation mismatch problems as observed in privacy-preserving data
mining solutions by Kargupta et al [18]; furthermore, the irreversibility of the quantization process implies
that the suppressed or distorted data cannot be reversed despite knowledge of the actual statistics. In the
following Section, we formalize these notions and present a rigorous analysis.
IV. MODEL AND METRICS
A. Model for Databases
A database D is a matrix whose rows and columns represent the individual entries and their attributes,
respectively. For example, the attributes of a healthcare database can include name, address, SSN, gender,
and a collection of possible medical information. The attributes that directly give away information such
as name and SSN are typically considered private data.
Model: Our proposed model focuses on large databases with K attributes per entry. Let Xk, for all
k ∈ K = {1, 2, , . . . ,K}, and Z be finite sets. Let Xk ∈ Xk be a random variable denoting the kth
attribute, k = 1, 2, . . . ,K, and let XK ≡ (X1,X2, . . . ,XK). A database d with n rows is a sequence of
n independent observations from the distribution having a probability distribution
pXK (xK) = pX1X2...XK (x1, x2, . . . , xK) (1)
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which is assumed to be known to both the designers and users of the database. Our simplifying assumption
of row independence holds generally in large databases (but not always) as correlation typically arises
across attributes and can be ignored across entries given the size of the database. We write XnK =
(Xn1 ,X
n
2 , . . . ,X
n
K) to denote the n independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) observations of XnK.
The joint distribution in (1) models the fact that the attributes corresponding to an individual entry are
correlated in general and consequently can reveal information about one another.
Public and private attributes: We consider a general model in which some attributes need to be kept
private while the source can reveal a function of some or all of the attributes. We write Kr and Kh to
denote sets of private (subscript h for hidden) and public (subscript r for revealed) attributes, respectively,
such that Kr ∪ Kh = K ≡{1, 2, . . . ,K}. We further denote the corresponding collections of public and
private attributes by XKr ≡ {Xk}k∈Kr and XKh ≡ {Xk}k∈Kh , respectively. More generally, we write
XSh ≡ {Xk : k ∈ Sh ⊆ Kh} and XSr ≡ {Xk : k ∈ Sr ⊆ Kr} to denote subsets of private and public
attributes, respectively.
Our notation allows for an attribute to be both public and private; this is to account for the fact that
a database may need to reveal a function of an attribute while keeping the attribute itself private. In
general, a database can choose to keep public (or private) one or more attributes (K > 1). Irrespective of
the number of private attributes, a non-zero utility results only when the database reveals an appropriate
function of some or all of its attributes.
Revealed attributes and side information: As discussed in the previous section, the public attributes
are in general sanitized/distorted prior to being revealed in order to reduce possible inferences about
the private attributes. We denote the resulting revealed attributes as XˆKr ≡ {Xˆk}k∈Kr . In addition to
the revealed information, a user of a database can have access to correlated side information from other
information sources. We model the side information (s.i.) as an n-length sequence Zn = (Z1, Z2, . . . , Zn),
Zi ∈ Z for all i, which is correlated with the database entries via a joint distribution pXKZ (xK,z).
Reconstructed database: The final reconstructed database at the user will be either a database of
revealed public attributes (when no s.i. is available) or a database generated from a combination of the
revealed public attributes and the side information (when s.i. is available).
B. Metrics: The Privacy and Utility Principle
Even though utility and privacy measures tend to be specific to the application, there is a fundamental
principle that unifies all these measures in the abstract domain. A user perceives the utility of a perturbed
database to be high as long as the response is similar to the response of the unperturbed database;
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thus, the utility is highest of an unperturbed database and goes to zero when the perturbed database is
completely unrelated to the original database. Accordingly, our utility metric is an appropriately chosen
average ‘distance’ function between the original and the perturbed databases.
Privacy, on the other hand, is maximized when the perturbed response is completely independent of the
data. Our privacy metric measures the difficulty of extracting any private information from the response,
i.e., the amount of uncertainty or equivocation about the private attributes given the response. One could
alternately quantify the privacy loss from revealing data as the mutual information between the private
attributes and the response; mutual information is typically used to quantify leakage (or secrecy) for
continuous valued data.
C. Utility and Privacy Aware Encoding
Since database sanitization is traditionally the process of distorting the data to achieve some measure
of privacy, it is a problem of mapping a database to a different one subject to specific utility and privacy
requirements.
Mapping: Our notation below relies on this abstraction. Let Xk, k ∈ K, and Z, be as above and let
Xˆj be additional finite sets for all j ∈ Kr. Recall that a database d with n rows is an instantiation of
XnK. Thus, we will henceforth refer to a real database d as an input database and to the corresponding
sanitized database (SDB) ds as an output database. When the user has access to side information, the
reconstructed database d′ at the user will in general be different from the output database.
Our coding scheme consists of an encoder FE which is a mapping from the set of all input databases
(i.e., all databases d allowable by the underlying distribution) to a set of indices J ≡ {1, 2, . . . ,M} and
an associated table of output databases (each of which is a ds) given by
FE : (X
n
1 × . . .× X
n
k )k∈Kenc → J ≡ {SDBk}
M
k=1 (2)
where Kr ⊆ Kenc ⊆ K and M is the number of output (sanitized) databases created from the set of all
input databases. To allow for the case where an attribute can be both public and private, we allow the
encoding FE in (2) to include both public and private attributes. A user with a view of the SDB (i.e.,
an index j ∈ J ) and with access to side information Zn, whose entries Zi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, take values
in the alphabet Z , reconstructs the database d′ via the mapping
FD : J × Z
n →
(∏
k∈Kr
Xˆ nk
)
. (3)
The encoding and decoding are assumed known at both parties.
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Utility: Relying on a distance based utility principle, we model the utility u via the requirement that
the average distortion of the public variables is upper bounded, for each ǫ > 0 and all sufficiently large
n, as
u ≡ E
[
1
n
∑n
i=1ρ
(
XKr,i, XˆKr ,i
)]
≤ D + ǫ, (4)
where ρ (·, ·) denotes a distortion function, E is the expectation over the joint distribution of (XKr , XˆKr),
and the subscript i denotes the ith entry of the database. Examples of distortion functions include the
Euclidean distance for Gaussian distributions, the Hamming distance for binary input and output databases,
and the Kullback-Leibler (K-L) divergence. We assume that D takes values in a closed compact set to
ensure that the maximal and minimal distortions are finite and all possible distortion values between
these extremes can be achieved.
Privacy: We quantify the equivocation e of all the private variables using entropy as
e ≡
1
n
H
(
XnKh |J,Z
n
)
≥ E − ǫ. (5)
Analogous to (5), we can quantify the privacy leakage l using mutual information as
l ≡
1
n
I
(
XnKh ;J,Z
n
)
≤ L+ ǫ. (6)
Remark 1: The case in which side information is not available at the user is obtained by simply setting
Zn = ∅ in (3) and (5).
We shall henceforth focus on using equivocation as a privacy metric except for the case where the
source is modeled as continuous valued data since unlike differential entropy, mutual information is
strictly non-negative. From (5), we have H(XKh |XKr, Z) ≤ E ≤ H(XKh |Z) ≤ H(XKh), where the
upper bound on the equivocation results when the private and public attributes (and side information) are
uncorrelated and the lower bound results when the public attributes (and side information) completely
preserve the correlation between the public and private attributes. Note that the leakage can be analogously
bound as 0 ≤ I(XKh ;Z) ≤ L ≤ I(XKh ;XKr, Z).
The mappings in (2) and (3) ensure that d is mapped to d′ such that the U-P constraints in (4) and (5)
are met. The formalism in (1)-(6) is analogous to lossy compression in that a source database is mapped
to one of M quantized databases that are designed a priori. For a chosen encoding, a database realization
is mapped to the appropriate quantized database, subject to (4) and (5). It suffices to communicate the
index J of the resulting quantized database as formalized in (2) to the user. This index, in conjunction
with side information, if any, enables a reconstruction at the user as in (3). Note that the mappings in (2)
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and (3), i.e., lossy compression with privacy guarantees, ensure that for any D > 0, the user can only
reconstruct the database d′ = XˆnKr , formally a function f (J,Zn), and not d = XnK itself.
The utility and privacy metrics in (4) and (5) capture the statistical nature of the problem, i.e., the
fact that the entries of the database statistically mirror the distribution (1). Thus, both metrics represent
averages across all database instantiations d, and hence, (assuming stationarity and large n) over the
sample space of XK thereby quantifying the average distortion (utility) and equivocation (privacy)
achievable per entry.
Remark 2: In general, a database may need to satisfy utility constraints for any collection of subsets
S
(l)
r ⊆ Kr of attributes and privacy constraints on all possible subsets of private attributes S(m)h , m =
1, 2, . . . , Lp, 1 ≤ Lp ≤ 2
|Kh|− 1 where |Kh| is the cardinality of Kh. For ease of exposition and without
loss of generality, we develop the results for the case of utility and privacy constraints on the set of all
public and private attributes. The results can be generalized in a straightforward manner to constraints
on arbitrary subsets.
V. UTILITY-PRIVACY TRADEOFFS
Mapping utility to distortion and privacy to information uncertainty via entropy (or leakage via mutual
information) leads to the following definition of the U-P tradeoff region.
Definition 1: The U-P tradeoff region T is the set of all feasible U-P tuples (D,E) for which there
exists a coding scheme (FE , FD) given by (2) and (3), respectively, with parameters (n,M, u, e) satisfying
the constraints in (4) and (5).
While the U-P tradeoff region in Definition 1 can be determined for specific database examples, one
has to, in general, resort to numerical techniques to solve the optimization problem [19]. To obtain closed
form solutions that define the set of all tradeoff points and identify the optimal encoding schemes, we
exploit the rich set of techniques from rate distortion theory with and without equivocation constraints.
To this end, we study a more general problem of RDE by introducing an additional rate constraint
M ≤ 2n(R+ǫ) which bounds the number of quantized SDBs in (2). Besides enabling the use of known
rate-distortion techniques, the rate constraint also has an operational significance. For a desired level of
accuracy (utility) D, the rate R is the precision required on average (over XK) to achieve it. We now
define the achievable RDE region as follows.
Definition 2: The RDE region RRDE is the set of all tuples (R,D,E) for which there exists a coding
scheme given by (2) and (3) with parameters (n,M, u, e) satisfying the constraints in (4), (5), and on
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Fig. 3. (a) Rate Distortion Equivocation Region [1]; (b) Utility-Privacy Tradeoff Region.
the rate. In this region, RD−E , the set of all feasible distortion-equivocation tuples (D,E) is defined as
RD−E ≡ {(D,E) : (R,D,E) ∈ RRDE , R ≥ 0} . (7)
The RDE problem differs from the distortion-equivocation problem in including a constraint on the
precision of the public variables in addition to the equivocation constraint on the private data in both
problems. Thus, in the RDE problem, for a desired utility D, one obtains the set of all rate-equivocation
tradeoff points (R,E) , and therefore, over all distortion choices, the resulting region contains the set of
all (D,E) pairs. From Definitions 1 and 2, we thus have the following proposition.
Proposition 1: T = RD−E .
Proposition 1 is captured pictorially in Fig. 3(b). The functions R (D,E) and Γ(D) in Fig. 3 capture
the rate and privacy boundaries of the region and are the minimal rate and maximal privacy achievable,
respectively, for a given distortion D.
The power of Proposition 1 is that it allows us to study the larger problem of database U-P tradeoffs
in terms of a relatively familiar problem of source coding with additional privacy constraints. Our result
shows the tradeoff between utility (distortion), privacy (equivocation), and precision (rate) – fixing the
value of any one determines the set of operating points for the other two; for example, fixing the utility
(distortion D) quantifies the set of all achievable privacy-precision tuples (E,R).
For the case of no side information, i.e., for the problem in (2)-(5) with Zn = ∅, the RDE region
was obtained by Yamamoto [1] for Kr = Kh = 1 and Kr ∩ Kh = ∅. We henceforth refer to this as
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an uninformed case, since neither the encoder (database) nor the decoder (user) have access to external
information sources. We summarize the result below in the context of a utility-privacy tradeoff region.
We first summarize the intuition behind the results and the encoding scheme achieving it.
In general, to obtain the set of all achievable RDE tuples, one follows two steps: the first is to obtain
(outer) bounds for a (n,M, u, e) code on the rate and equivocation required to decode reliably with a
distortion D (vanishing error probability in decoding for a bounded distortion D); the second step is a
constructive coding scheme for which one determines the inner bounds on rate and equivocation. The
set of all (R,D,E) tuples is achievable when the two bounds meet. The achievable RDE region was
developed in [1, Appendix] for the problem in 2. Focusing on the set of all RDE tradeoff points, we
restate the results in [1, Appendix] as follows.
Proposition 2: Given a database with public, private, and reconstructed variables XKr , XKh , and XˆKr
respectively, and Z = ∅, for a fixed target distortion D, the set of achievable (R,E) tuples satisfy
R ≥ RU (D) ≡ I(XKrXKh ; XˆKr) (8a)
E ≤ EU (D) ≡ H(XKh |XˆKr) (8b)
for some p(xKh , xKr , xˆKr) such that E(d(XKr , XˆKr)) ≤ D.
Remark 3: The distribution p(xKh , xKr , xˆKr) allows for two cases, one in which both the public and
private attributes are used to encode (e.g., medical) and the other in which only the public (e.g., census)
attributes are used. For the latter case in which the private attributes are only implicitly used (via the
correlation), the distribution simplifies as p(xKh , xKr)p(xˆKr |xKh), i.e., the variables satisfy the Markov
chain XKh −XKr − XˆKr .
Theorem 1: The U-P tradeoff region for a database problem defined by (1)-(5) and with Zn = ∅ is
the set of all (E,D) such that for every choice of distortion D ∈ D that is achievable by quantization
scheme with a distribution p(xKh , xKr xˆKr), the privacy achievable is given by EU (D) in (8b) (for which
a rate of RU (D) in (8a) is required).
The set of all RDE tuples in (8) define the region R∗RDE . The functions in Fig. 3 specifying the
boundaries of this region are given as follows: R (D,E) which is the minimal rate required for any
choice of distortion D is given by
R (D,E) = R (D,E∗) = min
p(xKh ,xKr ,xˆKr )
RU (D) , (9)
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where E∗ = EU (D)|p∗ is evaluated at p∗ is the argument of the optimization in (9) and Γ(D) which is
the maximal equivocation achievable for a desired distortion D is given by
Γ(D) = max
minp(xKh,xKr ,xˆKr )
EU (D) . (10)
Remark 4: In general, the functions R (D,E) and Γ (D) may not be optimized by the same distribution
p(xKh , xKr , xˆKr), i.e., R (D,E) may be minimal for a E = E∗ < Γ(D). This implies that in general
the minimal rate encoding scheme is not necessarily the same as the encoding scheme that maximizes
equivocation (privacy) for a given distortion D. This is because a compression scheme that only satisfies
a fidelity constraint on XKr , i.e., source coding without additional privacy constraints, is oblivious of the
resulting leakage of XKh whereas a compression scheme which minimizes the leakage of XKh while
revealing XKr will first reveal that part of XKr that is orthogonal to XKh and only reveal XKh when
the fidelity requirements are high enough to encode it. Thus, maximal privacy may require additional
precision (of the component of XKr orthogonal to XKh) relative to the fidelity-only case. The additional
rate constraint enables us to intuitively understand the nature of the lossy compression scheme required
when privacy need to be guaranteed.
We now focus on the case in which the user has access to correlated side information. The resulting
RDE tradeoff theorems generalize the results in [1]; furthermore, we present a new relatively easier
proof for the achievable equivocation while introducing a class of encoding schemes that we refer to as
quantize-and-bin coding (see also [20]).
A. Capturing the Effects of Side-Information
In general, a user can have access to auxiliary information either from prior interactions with the
database or from a correlated external source. We cast this problem in information-theoretic terms as
a database encoding problem with side information at the user. Two cases arise in this context: i) the
database has knowledge of the side information due to prior interactions with the user and is sharing
a related but differently sanitized view in the current interaction, i.e., an informed encoder; and ii) the
database does not know the exact side information but has some statistical knowledge, i.e., an statistically
informed encoder. We develop the RDE regions for both cases below.
1) U-P Tradeoffs: Statistically Informed Encoder: We first focus on the case with side information
at the user and knowledge of its statistics at the encoder, i.e., at the database. The following theorem
quantifies the RDE region, and hence, the utility-privacy tradeoff region for this case.
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Theorem 2: For a target distortion D, the set of achievable (R,E) tuples when the database has access
to the statistics of the side information is given as
R ≥ RSI (D) ≡ I(XKrXKh ;U |Z) (11a)
E ≤ ESI (D) ≡ H(XKh |UZ) (11b)
for some distribution p(xKh , xKr , z)p (u|xKh , xKr) such that there exists a function XˆKr = f(U,Z) for
which E
[
d(XKr , XˆKr)
]
≤ D, and |U| = |XK|+ 1.
Remark 5: For the case in which only the public variables are used in encoding, i.e., XKh−XKr −U,
|U| = |XKr |+ 1.
We prove Theorem 2 in the Appendix. Here, we present a sketch of the achievability proof. The main
idea is to show that a quantize-and-bin encoding scheme achieves the RDE tradeoff.
The intuition behind the quantize-and-bin coding scheme is as follows: the source
(
XnKr ,X
n
Kh
)
is
first quantized to Un at a rate of I(XK˙rX
n
Kh
;U). For the uninformed case, the encoder would have
simply sent the index for Un (≡ XˆnKr) to the decoder. However, since the encoder has statistical
knowledge of the decoder’s side information, the encoder further bins Un to reduce the transmission
rate to I(XKrXKh ;U) − I(Z;U) where I(Z;U) is a measure of the correlation between Zn and Un.
The encoder then transmits this bin index J so that using J and Zn, the user can losslessly reconstruct
Un, and hence, XˆnKr = f (U
n, Zn) via a deterministic function f to the desired D.
The outer bounds follow along the lines of the Wyner-Ziv converse as well as outer bounds on the
equivocation (see the Appendix). The key result here is the inner bound on the equivocation, i.e., for a
fixed distortion D, the quantize-and-bin encoding scheme can guarantee a lower bound on the equivocation
as H(XKh |U,Z) which primarily relies on the fact that using the bin index J and side information Zn,
the quantized database Un can be losslessly reconstructed at the user.
Uninformed case: Here, we have Z = 0 and U = XˆKr , i.e., the reconstructed and sanitized databases
are the same. Note that in this case, the quantize-and-bin scheme simplifies to a simple quantize scheme
(as required to achieve Proposition 2).
Remark 6: For a desired D, minimizing RSI(D) yields the Wyner-Ziv rate-distortion function. How-
ever, we focus here on the tradeoff region, and hence, the set of all (R,D,E) tuples.
2) U-P Tradeoffs: Informed Encoder: We now consider the case in which the encoder also has perfect
knowledge of the side information. Such a case can arise in practice if the encoder has shared some prior
information related to the database earlier. The following theorem summarizes the RDE tradeoff region
for this case.
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Theorem 3: For a target distortion D, the set of achievable (R,E) tuples when the encoder has perfect
knowledge of the side information is given as
R ≥ RI (D) ≡ I(XKr ,XKh ; XˆKr |Z) (12a)
E ≤ EI (D) ≡ H(XKh |XˆKrZ) (12b)
for some distribution p(xKh , xKr , z)p (xˆKr |xKh , xKr , z) for which E
[
d(XKr , XˆKr)
]
≤ D.
Remark 7: For Zn = ∅, Theorem 3 simplifies to Proposition 2.
We prove Theorem 3 in the Appendix. The main idea is to show that an informed quantize-and-bin
encoding scheme for the informed case in which both (XnK, Zn) are available at the encoder achieves
the RDE tradeoff. The encoder jointly compresses them to a database XˆnKr which it further bins and
reveals the bin index to the decoder such that the rate of transmission reduces to I(XKZ; XˆKr) −
I(Z; XˆKr) = I(XK; XˆKr |Z). Using the bin index and side information Zn, the database XˆnKr can be
losslessly reconstructed. The outer bounds follow from standard results on conditional rate-distortion
converse (see the Appendix). The key result is the inner bound on the equivocation, i.e., for a fixed
D, the quantize-and-forward scheme is shown to guarantee a minimal equivocation of H(XKh |XˆKr , Z)
using the fact that from J and Zn, XˆnKr can be losslessly reconstructed at the user.
VI. ILLUSTRATION OF RESULTS
In this Section, we apply the utility-privacy framework we have introduced to model two fundamental
types of databases and illustrate the corresponding optimal coding schemes that achieve the set of
all utility-privacy tradeoff points. More importantly, we demonstrate how the optimal input to output
probabilistic mapping (coding scheme) in each case sheds light on practical privacy-preserving techniques.
We note that for the i.i.d. source model considered, vector quantization (to determine the set of M output
databases) simplifies to finding the probabilities of mapping the letters of the source to letters of the
output (database) alphabet as formally shown in the previous Section.
We model two broad classes of databases: categorical and numerical. Categorical data are typically
discrete data sets comprising information such as gender, social security numbers and zip codes that
provide (meaningful) utility only if they are mapped within their own set. On the other hand, without
loss of generality, numerical data can be assumed to belong to the set of real numbers or integers as
appropriate. In general, a database will have a mixture of categorical and numerical attributes, but for the
purpose of illustration, we assume that the database is of one type or the other, i.e., every attribute is of
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the same kind. In both cases, we assume a single utility (distortion) function. We discuss each example
in detail below.
Recall that the abstract mapping in (2) is a lossy compression of the database. The underlying principle
of optimal lossy compression is that the number of bits required to represent a sample x of X ∼ pX is
inversely proportional to log (p(x)), and thus, for a desired D, preserving the events in descending order
of pX requires the least number of bits on average. The intuitive notion of privacy as being unidentifiable
in a crowd is captured in this information-theoretic formulation since the low probability entries, the
outliers, that convey the most information, are the least represented. It is this fundamental notion that is
captured in both examples.
Example 1: Consider a categorical database with K ≥ 1 attributes. In general, the kth attribute Xk
takes values in a discrete set Xk of cardinality Mk. For our example, we assume that all attributes need
to be revealed, and therefore, it suffices to view each entry (a row of all K attributes) of the database as
generated from a discrete scalar source X of cardinality M , i.e., X ∼ p(x), x ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M}. Taking
into account the fact that sanitizing categorical data requires mapping within the same set, for this arbitrary
discrete source model, we assume that the output sample space Xˆ = X . Since changing a sample of the
categorical data can significantly change the utility of the data, we account for this via a utility function
that penalizes such changes. We thus model the utility function as a generalized Hamming distortion
which captures this cost model (averaged over all samples of X) such that the average distortion D is
given by
D = Pr
{
X 6= Xˆ
}
. (13)
Focusing on the problem of revealing the entire database d = Xn (a n-sequence realization of X) as
Xˆn, we define the equivocation as
1
n
H(Xn|Xˆn) ≥ E. (14)
Thus, the utility-privacy problem is that of finding the set of all (D,E) pairs such that for every choice
of p(xˆ|x) achieving a desired D, the equivocation is bounded as in (14). Applying Proposition 2 (and
also Theorem 3 with Zn = ∅), we have that for a target distortion D, the set of achievable (R,E) tuples
satisfy
R ≥ RU (D) ≡ I(X; Xˆ); E ≤ EU (D) ≡ H(X|Xˆ) (15a)
for some distribution p(x)p (xˆ|x) for which E
[
d(X, Xˆ)
]
≤ D. Note that the rate RU (D) = H(X) −
EU (D), and thus, minimizing RU (D) for a desired D maximizes EU (D) . Thus, while (15) defines the
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set of all (R,D,E) tuples, we focus on the (D,E) pairs for which maximal equivocation (privacy) is
achieved.
The problem of minimizing RU (D) for an arbitrary source with a generalized Hamming distortion
has been studied in [21] who showed that R(D) is achieved by reverse waterfilling solution such that
p(xˆ) =
(p(x)− λ)+∑
x∈X (p(x)− λ)
+ (16)
and the ‘test channel’ (mapping from Xˆ to X) is given by
p(x|xˆ) =


D, x = xˆ
λ, x 6= xˆ, x ∈ Xˆsupp
pk, x = k 6∈ Xˆsupp
(17)
where D = 1 − D, λ is chosen such that
∑
xˆ p(xˆ)p(x|xˆ) = p(x), pk = p (x = k), and Xˆsupp =
{x : p(x)− λ > 0} . Let S =
∣∣∣Xˆsupp∣∣∣ − 1. The maximal achievable equivocation, and hence, the largest
utility-privacy tradeoff region is
Γ(D) = −D logD − Sλ log λ−
∑
k 6∈Xˆsupp
pk log pk. (18)
The waterlevel λ is the Lagrangian for the distortion constraint in minimizing RU (D). The distribution of
entries in d′ in (16) demonstrates that the source samples with low probabilities relative to the water level
are not preserved, leading to a ‘flattening’ of the output distribution. Thus, we see that the commonly used
heuristics of outlier suppression, aggregation, and imputation [7], [8] on census and related databases can
be formally shown to minimize privacy leakage for the appropriate model. We illustrate our results in
Fig. 4 for pX (x) = [0.25 0.25 0.15 0.1 0.04 0.005 0.003 0.002] in which the first subplot demonstrates
increased suppression of the outliers with increasing D, and the second shows the entire U-P region.
Interpretation: The probability p(x) is the assumed probability of occurrence of each unique sample
(e.g., names such as Smith, Johnson, Poor, Sankar, etc.) in the database. For categorical data, the attribute
space for the input and output databases are assumed to be the same (e.g., names mapped to names).
The Hamming distortion measure we have chosen quantifies the average probability of a true sample of
the source being mapped to a different sample in the output database (e.g., probability that a name in the
input database is mapped to a different name in the output database averaged over all names). The output
distribution in (16) implies that for a desired utility (quantified via a Hamming distortion D), all the input
samples with probabilities below a certain λ (e.g., say ‘Sankar,’ a very low probability name) will not
be present in the output database. The water-level λ is chosen such that the input and output database
samples satisfy D in (13). Thus, the probability of guessing that Sankar was in the original database given
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Fig. 4. a) Reverse WF distributions for D=0.1,0.25,0.5; b) U-P tradeoff region.
one only sees Smith, Johnson, and Poor is given by (17) and is the same as the probability of Sankar
in the original database, i.e., there is no reduction in uncertainty about Sankar given the published data!
Furthermore, given that the name Smith is published, the probability that Smith resulted from others such
as Johnson, Poor, and Sankar as well as from Smith is also given by (17). This shows that every sample
in the output database contains some uncertainty about the actual sample with maximal uncertainty for
those suppressed. Our mapping not only mathematically minimizes the leakage of the original samples
but also does so to provide privacy to all and maximally to those who are viewed as outliers (relative
to the utility measure). For simplicity, we have chosen a single private attribute, name, in this example.
In general, there could be several correlated attributes (e.g. name and last four digits of the SSN) that
will be changed together. This is captured by our joint distribution. This eliminates the possibility that
the adversary uses his knowledge of the distribution to tell which individual entries have been changed.
The use of Hamming distortion measure in this example illustrates another aspect of the power of our
model. Sanitization of non-numeric data attributes in a utility-preserving way is hard to do, especially
because distance metrics for non-numeric data tend to be application-specific. Hamming distortion is an
example of an extreme measure that penalizes every change uniformly, no matter how small the change.
It may be appropriate to use this measure for applications that are especially sensitive to utility loss.
Example 2: In this example we model a numerical (e.g. medical) database in which the attributes such
as weight and blood pressure are often assumed to be normally (Gaussian) distributed. Specifically, we
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consider a K = 2 database with a public X (≡ Xr) and a private Y (≡ Xh) attribute such that X and Y
are jointly Gaussian with zero means and variances σ2X and σ2Y , respectively, and a correlation coefficient
ρXY = E [XY ] / (σXσY ). We assume that only X is encoded such that Y −X − Xˆ holds. We consider
three cases: (i) no side information, (ii) side information Zn at user, and (iii) Zn at both. For the cases
with Zn, we assume that Z is i.i.d. zero mean with variance σ2Z and is jointly Gaussian with (X,Y )
such that Y −X −Z forms a Markov chain and has a correlation coefficient ρXZ = E [XZ] / (σXσZ).
We use the leakage L in (6) as the privacy metric.
Case (i): No side information: The (R,D,L) region for this case can be obtained directly from
Proposition 2 in (8) with XˆKr ≡ Xˆ and EU (D) replaced by LU (D) ≡ I(Y ; Xˆ). For a Gaussian (X,Y ) ,
one can easily verify that, for a desired D, both RU (D) and LU (D) are minimized by a Gaussian Xˆ
[17, Chap. 10], i.e., for normally distributed databases, the privacy-maximizing revealed database is
also normally distributed. Furthermore, due to Y − X − Xˆ , the minimization of I(X; Xˆ) is strictly
over p(xˆ|x), and thus, simplifies to the familiar R-D problem for a Gaussian source that is achieved by
choosing Xˆ = X + N , where the noise N ∼ N
(
0, σ2N
)
is independent of X and its variance σ2N is
chosen such that D = Evar
(
X|Xˆ
)
∈
[
0, σ2X
]
where var denotes variance. The resulting minimal rate
and leakage achieved (in bits per entry) are, for D ∈ [0, σ2X] ,
R∗U (D) =
1
2
log
(
σ2X
D
)
,
L∗U (D) =
1
2
log
(
1[(
1− ρ2XY
)
+ ρ2XYD
/
σ2X
]
)
.
The largest U-P tradeoff region is thus the region enclosed by L(D).
Case (ii): For the statistically informed encoder, the (R,D,L) region is given by (11) with ESI (D)
replaced by LSI (D) = I(Y ;UZ). One can show the optimality of Gaussian encoding in minimizing
both the rate and leakage in 11, and thus, we have U = X+N, where N ∼ N
(
0, σ2N
)
is independent of
X and its variance σ2N is chosen such that the distortion D = Evar (X|UZ) ∈
[
0, σ2X
]
. Computing the
minimal rate R∗SI (D) (the Wyner-Ziv rate [22]) and leakage L∗SI (D) for a jointly Gaussian distribution
achieving a distortion D, we obtain for all D ∈
[
0, σ2X (1− ρXZ)
]
,
R∗SI (D) = RWZ (D) =
1
2
log
(
σ2X
(
1− ρ2XZ
)
D
)
L∗SI(D) = L
∗
U (D) ,
i.e., the minimal rate and leakage are independent of ρ2XY and ρ2XZ , respectively, and thus, user side
information does not degrade privacy when the minimal-rate encoding is used. The access to side
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Fig. 5. Plot of Rate and Leakage vs. D for Cases (i), (ii), and (iii).
information at the user implies that the maximal achievable distortion is at most as large as the uninformed
case. Note that unlike L∗U (D) which goes to zero at the maximal distortion of σ2X , L∗SI (D) > 0 for
D = σ2X
(
1− ρ2XZ
)
as a result of the implicit correlation between Y and Z . These observations are
clearly shown in Fig. 5 for σ2X = 1 and different values of ρ2XY and ρ2XZ .
Case (iii): Finally, for a Gaussian source model, the (R,D,L) region achievable for the informed
encoder-decoder pair is the same as that for Case (ii). This is because of the no rate-loss property of
Wyner-Ziv coding for a Gaussian source, i.e., knowledge of the side information statistics at the encoder
suffices to remove the correlation from each entry before sharing data with the user [23]. Furthermore,
since Gaussian outputs minimize the rate as well as the leakage, the minimal R∗I (D) = R∗SI (D) and
L∗I (D) = L
∗
SI (D) (see Fig. 5.
Interpretation: The RDL and U-P tradeoffs for the Gaussian models considered here reveal that the
privacy-maximal code requires that the reconstructed database is also Gaussian distributed. This in turn is a
direct result of the following fact: a Gaussian distribution has the maximal (conditional and unconditional)
entropy (uncertainty) for a fixed variance [17, Chap 8, Th. 8.6.5] (and hence, a fixed mean-squared
distortion between the input and output databases). Thus, if one wishes to preserve the most uncertainty
about the original input database from the output, the output must also be Gaussian distributed, i.e., it
suffices to add Gaussian noise, since the sum of two Gaussians is a Gaussian. The power of our model
and the results are that not only can one find the privacy-optimal noise perturbation for the Gaussian
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case but that practical applications such as medical analytics that assume Gaussian-distributed data can
still work on sanitized data, albeit with modified parameter values.
In [18], it was noted that Gaussian noise is often the easiest to filter and this observation may seem
to be in conflict with our result – if the added noise can be filtered out, the privacy protection afforded
by the added noise can be reduced by the adversary. However, what [18] actually shows is that when
the spectra of the noise and the data differ significantly the noise can be filtered, thereby jeopardizing
privacy measures. For the i.i.d. source model (i.e., a source with no memory) considered here, the i.i.d.
Gaussian noise that is added to guarantee privacy has the same flat power spectral density as the source,
and thus, the perturbed data cannot be distinguished from the added noise. In fact, the quantization that
underlies the information-theoretic sanitization mechanism developed here is an irreversible process and
one cannot obtain the original data except for D = 0 (i.e., the case of no sanitization). As a point of
comparison, we note that in a separate work on privacy of streaming data (non-i.i.d time-series data
modeled as a colored Gaussian process, i.e. data that has non-flat spectrum), we have shown that the
privacy-optimal noise perturbation requires the spectrum of the added noise to be non-flat to match that
of the non-i.i.d. data [2].
Our example also reveals how finding the optimal santization mechanism, i.e., the optimal mapping
from the original public to the revealed attributes depends both on the statistical model. In fact, it is for
this reason that adding Gaussian noise for any numerical database will not, in general, be optimal unless
the database statistics can be approximated by a Gaussian distribution.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The ability to achieve the desired level of privacy while guaranteeing a minimal level of utility and
vice-versa for a general data source is paramount. Our work defines privacy and utility as fundamental
characteristics of data sources that may be in conflict and can be traded off. This is one of the earliest
attempts at systematically applying information theoretic techniques to this problem. Using rate-distortion
theory, we have developed a U-P tradeoff region for i.i.d. data sources with known distribution.
We have presented a theoretical treatment of a universal (i.e. not dependent on specific data features
or adversarial assumptions) theory for privacy and utility that addresses both numeric and categorical
(non-numeric) data. We have proposed a novel notion of privacy based on guarding existing uncertainty
about hidden data that is intuitive but also supported by rigorous theory. Prior to our work there was no
comparable model that applied to both data types, so no side-by-side comparisons can be made across the
board between different approaches. The examples developed here are the first step towards understanding
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practical approaches with precise guarantees. The next step would be to pick specific sample domains
(e.g., medical data, census data), devise the appropriate statistical distributions and U-P metrics, set
desirable levels of privacy and utility parameters, and then analyze on test data. These topics for future
research however require the theoretical framework proposed here as a crucial first step.
Several challenges remain in quantifying utility-privacy tradeoffs for more general sources. For example,
our model needs to be generalized for non-i.i.d. data sources, sources with unknown distributions, and
sources lacking strong structural properties (such as Web searches). Results from rate-distortion theory
for sources-with-memory and universal lossy compression may help address these challenges. Farther
afield, our privacy guarantee is an average metric based on Shannon entropy which may be inadequate
for some applications where strong anonymity guarantees are required for every individual in a database
(such as an HIV database). Finally, we have recently extended this framework to privacy applications
with time-series sources [2] and organizational data disclosure [24].
APPENDIX
A. Proofs of Theorems 2 and 3
1) Statistically Informed Case: Proof of Theorem 2: Converse: We now formally develop lower and
upper bounds on the rate and equivocation, respectively, that is achievable for the statistically informed en-
coder case. We show that given a (n, 2n(R+ǫ),D+ǫ, E−ǫ) code there exists a p(xKr , xKh , z)p (u|xKr , xKh)
such that the rate and equivocation of the system are bounded as follows:
R+ ǫ ≥
1
n
logM ≥
1
n
H(J) ≥
1
n
I (J ;XnK|Z
n)
=
1
n
{H(XnK|Z
n)−H(XnK|JZ
n)} (19)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
H(XK,i|Zi) (20)
−
1
n
n∑
i=1
H
(
XK,i|X
i−1
K Zi
(
JZi−1Zni+1
))
≥
1
n
n∑
i=1
H(XK,i|Zi)−
1
n
n∑
i=1
H (XK,i|ZiUi) (21)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
RSI (Di) (22)
≥ RSI (D) (23)
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where Xi−1(·) = [X(·),1 X(·),2 . . . X(·),i−1], i ≥ 1, (20) follows from the assumption of an i.i.d. source,
(21) from the fact that conditioning does not increase entropy and by setting Ui ≡
(
JZi−1Zni+1
)
such
that Ui−XK −Zi forms a Markov chain for all i, and XˆKr,i = gi (J,Zn) = fi (Ui, Zi) for some gi and
fi, (22) from definition (11a) for
Di ≡ E
[
d
(
XK,i, XˆK,i
)]
, and ESI.i ≡ H(Yi|UiZi),
and (23) from the convexity of the function RSI (D) defined in (11a) (see [17, Chap. 10], [22]).
For the same (n, 2n(R+ǫ),D,E− ǫ) code considered, we can upper bound the achievable equivocation
as
E − ǫ ≤
1
n
H
(
XnKh |JZ
n
)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
H
(
XKh,i|X
i−1
Kh
Zi
(
JZi−1Zni+1
))
≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
H (XKh,i|ZiUi) (24)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
ESI (Di) (25)
≤ ESI (D) (26)
where (25) follows from (11b) and (26) follows from the concavity of the equivocation (logarithm)
function ESI .
Remark 8: If the private variables XnKh are not directly used in encoding, i.e., X
n
Kh
−XnKr −U
n form
a Markov chain, then from the i.i.d. assumption of the source and the resulting encoding, the Markov
chain XKh,i −XKr ,i − Ui holds for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Achievability: We briefly summarize the quantize-and-bin coding scheme for the statistically informed
encoder case. Consider an input distribution p(u, xK, z):
p(u, xK, z) = p(u, xK)p(z|xK),
i.e., U − XK − Z forms a Markov chain. Fix p (u|xK). First generate M = 2n(I(U ;XK)+ǫ), Un (w)
databases, w = 1, 2, . . . ,M , i.i.d. according to p (u). Let W denote the random variable for the index
w. Next, for ease of notation, denote the following:
S = 2nI(XK;U), R = 2nI(XK;U |Z), T = 2nI(U ;Z).
The encoder bins the un(w) sequences into R bins as follows:
J(un(w)) = k, if w ∈ [(k − 1)T + 1, kT ].
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Upon observing a source sequence xnK, the encoder searches for a un (w) sequence such that (xnK, un (w)) ∈
TXKU (n, ǫ) (the choice of M ensures that there exists at least one such w). The encoder sends J (w)
where J (w) is the bin index of un (w) sequence sent at a rate R = I(XK;U |Z) + ǫ.
This encoding scheme implies the decodability of Un sequence as follows: upon receiving the bin
index J(un(w)) = j, the uncertainty at the decoder about un(w) is reduced. In particular, having the bin
index j, it knows that there are only 2nI(U ;Z) possible un sequences that could have resulted in the bin
index j. It then uses joint typical decoding using Zn to decode the correct un sequence (the probability
of decoding error goes to zero as n→∞ by standard arguments as in the channel coding theorem). This
implies that using Fano’s inequality, the decoder having access to (J,Zn) can correctly W , and hence,
decode Un (W ) , with high probability, i.e.,
1
n
H(W |J,Zn) =
1
n
H(Un(W )|J,Zn) ≤ δ(n), (27)
where δ(n)→ 0 as n→∞.
2) Proof of Equivocation: For the quantize-and-bin scheme presented above, we will show that
lim
n→∞
1
n
H(XnKh |J,Z
n) ≥ H(XKh |U,Z)− ǫ,
which is equivalent to showing that
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(XnKh ;J,Z
n) ≤ I(XKh ;U,Z) + ǫ.
Our proof is based on the fact that for the chosen quantize-and-bin coding scheme, at the decoder
given the bin index and side information, the uncertainty of the quantized sequences Un approaches zero
for large n as shown in (27).
Consider the term I(XnKh ;J,U
n, Zn) which can be written as
I(XnKh ;J,Z
n) + I(XnKh ;U
n|J,Zn) (28a)
= I(XnKh ;J,Z
n) (28b)
= I(XnKh ;U
n, Zn) + I(XnKh ;J |U
n, Zn) (28c)
≤ I(XnKh ;U
n, Zn) (28d)
= nH(XKh)−H
(
XnKh |U
n, Zn
) (28e)
≤ n (I(XKh ;U,Z) + δ (n)) (28f)
≤ n (I(XKh ;U,Z) + ǫ) (28g)
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where (28b) follows from (27), (28c) follows from (27) and the fact that the mutual information is strictly
non-negative, (28d) follows from the fact that there is no uncertainty in bin index J(W ) given Un (W ),
(28e) follows from the i.i.d. assumption on the source and side information statistics, (28f) is proved in B
below such that δ (n)→ 0 as n→∞, and finally (28g) follows from choosing ǫ ≥ δ (n) that determines
the size M = 2n(R+ǫ) of the codebook arbitrarily small as n→∞.
3) Informed Encoder Case: Proof of Theorem 3: Converse: We now formally develop lower and upper
bounds on the rate and equivocation, respectively, that is achievable for the informed encoder case. The
converse for the rate mirrors standard converse and we clarify the steps briefly. We show that given a
(n, 2n(R+ǫ),D + ǫ, E − ǫ) code there exists a p(xKr , xKh , z)p (xˆKr |xKr , xKh , z) such that the rate and
equivocation of the system are bounded as follows:
R+ ǫ ≥
1
n
H(J) ≥
1
n
I (J ;XnK, Z
n) ≥
1
n
I(XnK;J |Z
n)
≥
1
n
n∑
i=1
H(XK,i|Zi)−
1
n
n∑
i=1
H
(
XK,i|JZ
nXˆnKr
)
≥
1
n
n∑
i=1
H(XK,i|Zi)−
1
n
n∑
i=1
H
(
XK,i|ZiXˆKr ,i
)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
RSI (Di) (29)
≥ RSI (D) (30)
where (30) follows from the convexity of the function RI (D) defined in (11a) [17, Chap. 10] for
Di ≡ E
[
d
(
XK,i, XˆK,i
)]
, and (31a)
EI.i ≡ H(Yi|XˆK,i). (31b)
For the same (n, 2n(R+ǫ),D,E − ǫ) code considered, we can upper bound the achievable equivocation
as
E − ǫ ≤
1
n
H
(
XnKh |JZ
n
)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
H
(
XKh,i|X
i−1
Kh
ZnJXˆnKr
)
(32)
≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
H
(
XKh,i|ZiXˆKr,i
)
(33)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
EI (Di) (34)
≤ EI (D) (35)
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where (32) follows from the fact that the reconstructed database XˆnKr is a function of the J and Zn,
(34) follows from the fact that conditioning does not increase entropy, (34) follows from (31b), and (26)
follows from the concavity of the equivocation (logarithm) function EI .
Remark 9: If the hidden variables XnKh are not directly used in encoding, i.e., X
n
Kh
−XnKr− Xˆ
n
Kr
form
a Markov chain, then from the i.i.d. assumption of the source and the resulting encoding, the Markov
chain XKh,i −XKr ,i − XˆKri holds for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Achievability: We briefly summarize the quantize-and-bin coding scheme for the informed encoder
case. The encoding mirrors that for the statistically informed case and in the interest of space only the
differences are highlighted below. The primary difference is that the database encoder now encodes both
(XK, Z) such that the input distribution p(xK, xˆKr , z) is
p(xK, xˆKr , z) = p(z, xK)p(xˆKr |xK, z).
i.e., XˆKr is a function of both XK and Z . This distribution is now used to generate M = 2n(I(XˆKr ;XKZ)+ǫ),
XˆnKr (w) sequences as before which are first quantized and then binned at a rate R = 2
nI(XK;XˆKr |Z).
Decoding follows analogously to the previous case, i.e., the decoder uses Zn and the bin index J to
decode the correct xˆnKr sequence (the probability of decoding error goes to zero as n→∞ by standard
arguments as in the channel coding theorem). This implies that using Fano’s inequality, the decoder
having access to (J,Zn) can correctly decode W , and hence, XˆnKr (W ) , with high probability, i.e.,
1
n
H(W |J,Zn) =
1
n
H(XˆnKr(W )|J,Z
n) ≤ ǫ(n), (36)
where ǫ(n)→ 0 as n→∞.
Proof of equivocation: For the quantize-and-bin scheme presented above, we need to show that
lim
n→∞
1
n
H(XnKh |J,Z
n) ≥ H(XKh |XˆKr , Z)− ǫ.
Our proof is based on the fact that for the chosen quantize-and-bin coding scheme, at the decoder given
the bin index J and side information Zn, the uncertainty of the quantized sequences XˆKr approaches
zero for large n as shown in (36). The proof is the same as (28) with U = XˆKr along with (36) and is
omitted for brevity.
B. Proof of (28f)
Here, we prove the following inequality:
H(XnKh |U
n, Zn) ≤ n(H(XKh |U,Z) + ǫ(n)).
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For ease of exposition, let Y n ≡ XnKh such that H(X
n
Kh
|Un, Zn) = H(Y n|Un, Zn) can be expanded
and bounded as
=
∑
(u,z)
p(u, z)H(Y n|Un = u, Zn = z)
=
∑
(u,z)∈TUZ
p(u, z)H(Y n|Un = u, Zn = z)
+
∑
(u,z)/∈TUZ
p(u, z)H(Y n|Un = u, Zn = z)
≤
∑
(u,z)∈TUZ
p(u, z)H(Y n|Un = u, Zn = z)
+
∑
(u,z)/∈TUZ
p(u, z)nH(Y )
≤
∑
(u,z)∈TUZ
p(u, z)(Y n|Un = u, Zn = z)
+ nH(Y )δ(n)
=
∑
(u,z)∈TUZ
p(u, z)
[
−
∑
y
p(y|u, z) log(p(y|u, z))
]
+ nH(Y )δ(n)
=
∑
(u,z)∈TUZ
p(u, z)
[
−
∑
y∈TY |u,z
p(y|u, z) log(p(y|u, z))
−
∑
y/∈TY |u,z
p(y|u, z) log(p(y|u, z))
]
+ nH(Y )δ(n)
≤
∑
(u,z)∈TUZ
p(u, z)
[
−
∑
y∈TY |u,z
p(y|u, z) log(p(y|u, z))
]
+ nH(X)δ(n) + ǫ(n)
≤ n(H(Y |U,Z) + 2ǫ(n) +H(Y )δ(n))
= n(H(Y |U,Z) + ζ(n)),
where ζ(n)→ 0 as n→∞.
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